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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

ADDOCI

EXTENSION

9320

NO.

DATE 28 June 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

STATINTL

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDI

2.

3.

4.

ADDOCI

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

OCI sees no difficulties
with this program or paper.

ADDOCI

STATINTL



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STATINTL

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

40 Committee

FROM:

ADOCI

EXTENSION

9320

NO.

DATE

10 August 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)


1.

ADDI

11 Aug 71

✓

We have no troubles with this CS request to the 40 Committee asking approval to continue



2.

3.

4.

5.

ADOCI

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15.

ADOCI

STATINTL

STATINTL



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25X1C

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DATE REC'D.

SECRET 20 MAY 1971

EYES ONLY

SECRET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

20 May 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : Comments on 40 Committee Paper

1. Our only comment on the program is a minor one which involves analysis of Soviet political trends rather than the program itself. We believe that the description of Soviet dissidence in the 1970s (P. 3) should emphasize its continuing vitality rather than its growth. We interpret the increasing incidence of arrest and incarceration of dissidents in mental institutions as evidence of a change in tactics by the authorities, rather than as an "increase" in an already widespread phenomenon.

2. Khrushchev used dissent as a political lever, turning it against his more conservative colleagues, in his campaign to revitalize Soviet society. His successors appear to have joined in a gentleman's agreement not to use dissent against each other, but rather to unite in muffling it.

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3. These comments should in no way be read, however, as a denigration of the importance of Soviet dissent,

25X1C


4. From the East European Branch's point of view, the stated impact of these projects squares with our knowledge and experience. This is something that is difficult to quantify, and we doubt that further studies would seriously advance our knowledge of the impact these projects have.

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EYES ONLY

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25X1A

[Redacted]
Acting Chief, European Division, OCI

Distribution:

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1 - EUR Chrono

1 - AC/EUR Chrono

DDI/OCI/EUR: [Redacted] /jm/7225/20May71

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